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How to engage workers in conservation efforts when the company pays the bill? In
a field experiment with 409 bus drivers, we investigate the potential of targeted
peer-comparison feedback and on-the-road coaching. Drivers receive individualized
reports with peer-comparison messages on multiple driving dimensions. In addi-
tion, coaches quasi randomly provide drivers with in person coaching moments on
the bus. Based on 800,000 trip-level observations, we find that the targeted peer-
comparison treatments do not improve driving. On-the-road coaching significantly
improves driving on multiple dimensions but only temporarily. Further analysis
reveals negative interaction effects between the two programs.
JEL classification: D2, M5, Q5.
Keywords: peer comparisons, coaching, worker motivation, fuel conservation.
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Transport is central to our everyday lives but takes a heavy toll on the environment,
accounting for one-fifth of global primary energy use and one-quarter of energy-related
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (IEA 2012). The largest share, about 79%, is consumed
by on-the-road vehicles (EIA 2015). Fuel-efficient driving is hailed as low-hanging fruit
to improve conservation levels (ICC 2013) but picking this fruit can be challenging when
drivers have no financial stake in fuel savings. This concern is particularly acute within
firms, where the design of conservation incentives is often dictated by institutional con-
straints that hinder the use of pay-for-performance schemes.1 How to non-financially
motivate workers to engage in green behaviors such as efficient driving is therefore a
critical question to ask in making firms more sustainable.
Innovations in the transport sector related to on-board monitoring open up novel
opportunities for tailoring and evaluating non-financial incentives.2 Electronic on-board
recorders (EOBR) enable high-frequency granular measurement of worker-level fuel con-
sumption and allow firms to not only identify high users but also to tailor feedback by
decomposing consumption into its underlying sources. This creates distinct possibilities
for new data-driven designs of conservation incentives (Brynjolfsson and McElheran 2016).
The link between fuel usage and production costs suggests that these incentives could cre-
ate a win-win scenario for the environment and the firm (Gosnell, List and Metcalfe 2016).
In this paper, we therefore join the installation process of new EOBRs in the entire
bus fleet of a large public transport company. Gathering over 800,000 trip-level obser-
vations on driving behavior, we evaluate two forms of tailored feedback among 409 bus
drivers: targeted peer-comparison feedback and on-the-road coaching. In a field exper-
iment, drivers are assessed on multiple driving dimensions and randomly assigned to
individualized reports with varying numbers of peer-comparison messages. In addition,
we evaluate the effects of a parallel coaching program with a quasi-experimental design.
In this program, designated experienced drivers offer tailored feedback while riding along
with their colleagues. Evidence shows that the selection of which driver receives in person
1See, e.g., Freeman (1981), who finds that within-establishment dispersion of wages is narrower in
unionized establishments. He attributes this in large part to unions’ wage practices, such as the adoption
of single wage rates (rather than pay based on merit).
2See Baker and Hubbard (2003) for early work incorporating this technology. They study how the
adoption of on-board computers has influenced the decision of truckers to integrate or outsource trucking
services.
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coaching when can be considered random. We follow drivers for two years in order to
establish a long baseline and experimental period, making it possible to measure both
immediate and delayed responses to the feedback programs.
Existing studies on non-financial incentive schemes in the residential sector stress the
importance of feedback and social approval (Allcott and Mullainathan 2010). For example,
incorporating social comparisons in feedback reports reduces household consumption of
energy (Allcott 2011) and water (Ferraro and Price 2013), with long-run effectiveness de-
pending on whether households alter their capital stock of habits or physical technologies
(Allcott and Rogers 2014). Recent research, however, also notes that social comparisons
can trigger asymmetric effects (Holladay, LaRiviere, Novgorodsky and Price 2016) and
may interact with other non-financial incentives when stimulating green behavior (Hahn,
Metcalfe, Novgorodsky and Price 2016). This has reinforced the need for detailed evalua-
tions of non-financial incentives pertaining to energy efficiency and also raises the question
how these findings generalize to workers.3
A small but emerging literature considers the workplace for evidence on the effect of
non-financial incentives on conservation efforts. One study reports fuel savings when air-
line captains are provided with tailored feedback (Gosnell et al. 2016). Other work finds
that the provision of social-comparison information in plants with (without) a team-
work culture leads to decreased (improved) truck driver performance (Blader, Garten-
berg and Prat 2016). This suggests that firms may fruitfully customize relative perfor-
mance feedback by tailoring the content or by targeting subsets of workers (Kuhnen and
Tymula 2012). Given that firms increasingly record and store data on multiple dimensions
of worker-level productivity, this seems a viable and promising approach to designing con-
servation incentives. This raises the key issue of what level of feedback is optimal. Should
managers reveal all relative positions on productivity dimensions to the worker or should
the information be dosed in such a way that only selected dimensions are shown?
Previous studies indicate that relative performance feedback can improve worker pro-
ductivity (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 2011), sales growth (Delfgaauw, Dur, Sol and
Verbeke 2013) and (high school) student performance (Tran and Zeckhauser 2012, Azmat
and Iriberri 2010). Some studies however report decreased performance after rankings
are provided (Ashraf, Bandiera and Lee 2014) and improved performance when they are
3In an overview article on the energy-efficiency gap, Allcott and Greenstone (2012) also call for more
empirical evaluations of the impact of energy efficiency programs on heterogeneous consumer types.
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abolished (Barankay 2012). Agents may exhibit rank incentives (Barankay 2012, Tran and
Zeckhauser 2012) in which relative performance information affects self-image (Benabou
and Tirole 2006) and status (Moldovanu, Sela and Shi 2007). These rank incentives can
lead to demotivation at the bottom of the performance distribution, which reduces the
average effects of feedback programs that rely on social comparisons (Ashraf et al. 2014).
What may account for some of the heterogeneity in results is that rankings are typ-
ically reported on final outcomes rather than on the intermediate steps leading to these
outcomes. In this form, the message may be demotivating because it gives little guidance
on where to improve and signals that improvement requires one big step rather than sev-
eral small and clear steps. Feedback provision on disaggregated productivity measures
can provide much more guidance on where to improve and makes it easier for workers to
change their behavior. Our research design does exactly that.
In close cooperation with our field partner Arriva Netherlands, we have the unique
opportunity to construct rankings on the driving dimensions Acceleration, Braking, and
Cornering (the so-called ABC-dimensions), and to experimentally vary the number of
relative positions that will be communicated to drivers in a monthly feedback report. A
driver’s ABC scores co-determine more aggregate measures of productivity such as fuel
efficiency and passenger comfort. In the first condition, we give drivers information on
the poor relative position on one dimension only, even if the driver performs relatively
poorly on multiple dimensions. That is, we deliberately withhold some rankings to al-
low drivers to focus their effort. The second condition is similar except that negative
feedback is supplemented with positive feedback in case a driver who performs poorly on
some dimensions scores well on others. For example, a driver who performs poorly on
acceleration but well on braking will receive a negative notification on the former dimen-
sion and a positive comment on the latter. This allows us to assess the value of providing
a mix of corrective and positive feedback. In the final condition, all relative positions
on driving behaviors are communicated whenever the driver performs poorly compared
to a reference group of peers. Drivers in the control condition do not receive this type
of personalized peer-comparison feedback. Together these interventions enable us to ex-
plore the potential of on-board monitoring technologies in the customization of relative
performance feedback.
Tailoring feedback to disaggregate productivity measures can be a cost-effective means
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to improve conservation efforts among workers (Gosnell et al. 2016). It may empower poor
performers by increasing the feeling of control, raising awareness of behaviors that require
attention, and by offering suggestions for specific actions that workers can take.4 The
feeling of being in control is a key source of human motivation (Ryan and Deci 2000).
Identifying and targeting behaviors that contribute to environmental problems should
therefore be central in the design of energy conservation interventions (Abrahamse, Steg,
Vlek and Rothengatter 2005).
In the context of relative performance feedback, however, the dosage of rankings may
matter as it could potentially aggravate adverse effects by making poor performance even
more salient to the worker. When information directly enters the utility function (Golman,
Hagmann and Loewenstein 2017), informing workers about poor performance on multiple
dimensions may motivation. Dohmen et al. (2011), for example, show that reward-
related brain areas negatively correlate with lower relative incomes. The increased level
of detail in feedback provision may also have adverse effects similar to the finding that
increasing feedback frequency could lead to more mistakes being made (Eriksson, Poulsen
and Villeval 2009) and reduced task effort due to overwhelmed cognitive resources (Lam,
DeRue, Karam and Hollenbeck 2011). This poses a challenge, given that poor performers
have the biggest room for improvement and are thus precisely the group that one wants
to target with detailed feedback. Our research design aims to address this challenge.
In our evaluation of the tailored peer-comparison treatments, we find that the aggre-
gate performance of treated drivers is not significantly different from drivers in a control
group with general feedback. The point estimates across treatments for fuel economy
(km/liters), an aggregate measure of driving behavior, are small in size, about 0.007
(0.015σ)5, and are (jointly) not statistically significant. Similar qualitative results are
obtained for acceleration, braking, and cornering. Notifying treated bus drivers that
peer-comparison messages are no longer included in the feedback reports does not lead to
a change in driving behavior in the post-experimental period.
On-the-road coaching is more effective in improving driving behavior. The largest
improvements are observed during the coaching day: fuel economy goes up (0.23σ)
and drivers engage in less excessive acceleration (0.26σ), braking (0.10σ), and corner-
4In a related domain, Jackson and Schneider (2015) show how checklists improve worker productivity
by serving as a “memory aid”.
5Reported effect sizes are based on the within standard deviation of the sample used for estimation.
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ing (0.20σ). Improvements tend to persist with a smaller magnitude in the ensuing weeks
but fade out after about eight to nine weeks. This suggests that, as time progresses,
coaching effects decay and drivers fall back into old driving habits.
There are important heterogeneous interaction effects between the peer-comparison
treatments and on-the-road coaching. Comparing coached and uncoached drivers in the
control group with general feedback, we find that coached drivers perform slightly better
during the experimental period (0.12σ for fuel economy). Coached drivers in the treatment
groups with targeted peer-comparison feedback, however, tend to perform worse in the
experimental period compared to their coached colleagues in the control group (about
0.16σ for fuel economy). For uncoached drivers, in contrast, we find that drivers in
the treatment groups improve on their driving behavior compared to their peers in the
control group (0.12σ for fuel economy). These results show that it is important to consider
interactions between interventions when designing corporate energy conservation schemes.
Our findings contribute to the broader societal challenge of combating unsustainable
energy consumption practices. While there has been much progress in our understanding
of non-financial incentives in residential energy consumption, more research is needed
to explore the extent to which these insights generalize to firms (Gerarden, Newell and
Stavins forthcoming, Gosnell et al. 2016). Our work aims to fill this gap by evaluating
the immediate and delayed (interaction) effects of two tailored feedback programs on the
driving behavior of bus drivers. It shows the potential of benefiting both the environment
and the firm through simple behavioral adjustments by workers.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the field setting of the study.
Section 3 elaborates on the research design and provides further details on the data
and both feedback programs. Section 4 provides an empirical analysis of the feedback




Our field partner is Arriva, a European-wide passenger transport company operating
various transport modes in the Dutch public transport industry.6 This study focuses on
buses, the firm’s largest business unit. In the Netherlands, bus concessions are granted
to companies by means of a tendering procedure (see Passenger Transport Act 2000).
It provides a company with the exclusive rights to operate in a designated area for a
number of years. As part of the procedure, the local government writes a statement of
requirements with the envisioned goals and plans for the area. Environmental objectives
feature prominently in these statements and stimulate interested firms to engage in green
behavior.7 The Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure noted that public transport is a “trend
setter” in the area of sustainable technologies (MIVW 2010).
One such technology is an electronic on-board recorder (EOBR) which meticulously
measures performance on several dimensions of driving behavior. For example, the ver-
sion used by our partner records trip-level performance on fuel consumption and so-called
comfort dimensions such as acceleration, braking and cornering (ABC). Each driver logs
into the system with a unique personnel number to match the performance records and
trip-related background variables. The EOBR technology enables precise monitoring and
provides managers and researchers with a wealth of high-frequency data on worker pro-
ductivity.
The system works as follows for the comfort dimensions. Based on test rides under
different circumstances, threshold performance levels are formulated by the company for
every dimension. During each trip, the EOBR records “events” whenever an action by
the driver is in excess of these thresholds. The number of events serves as a performance
measure, with less events indicating better driving behavior. The outcome data can sub-
sequently be linked with centralized databases containing information on a host of driver
and trip characteristics. This allows us to get a detailed picture of driver performance
over time under various on-the-road conditions.
6The Arriva Group is part of Deutsche Bahn. The company employs more than 60,000 people and
annually delivers more than 2.2 billion passenger journeys in 14 European countries.
7In one recent statement, interested companies are requested to submit a sustainability plan in which
they indicate how they make public transport in the concession area more environmentally friendly.
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2.2 The Company
As part of a campaign on economical and comfortable driving behavior, Arriva Nether-
lands is currently in the process of installing new EOBRs in the entire fleet. The old
technology reported large variations in fuel usage across buses, which the company at-
tributes to differences in driving behavior. The EOBR data will therefore be used as input
to monthly feedback reports that will be distributed among the drivers. In addition, a
new coaching program is introduced in which drivers receive real-time feedback and advice
from an experienced colleague during on-the-road sessions. The new technology and the
feedback programs are phased in over time in the concession areas.
For this study, we join the implementation process in the first concession area, com-
prising about two-thirds of a province in the Netherlands and serving about 5.16 million
travelers in a year.8 The majority of drivers in this area are tenured employees while a
small number (about 14%) operates on a temporary contract. Most of the drivers are
experienced and have a long career of driving buses or other vehicles. They are typically
not involved in other tasks within the organization. Opportunities for promotion are lim-
ited and the work council is currently against using financial incentives to reward good
performances. In the past, drivers received no personal feedback and were not aware of
being monitored.
Each driver belongs to one of the six base locations (usually a municipality) in the
area and operates on routes that are stipulated by the concession. For five locations,
virtually all routes are between cities and in rural areas. One location (the largest one)
has a mixture of urban and rural routes. A special bus type, which runs on natural gas,
operates on most of the urban trips. Routes are assigned based on timetables that do
not vary much across time. Drivers are thus familiar with their routes and have had time
to learn under different on-the-road circumstances. Timetables provide ample within-
location variation in the type of trips, thereby ensuring that drivers face a more or less
similar mixture of relatively easy and difficult trips.




Figure 1: Timeline of the Study







Figure 1 depicts the timeline of the study. First, we use the old on-board system to
establish a long baseline of fuel consumption, starting in January 2015. At this stage,
drivers are not informed about the upcoming feedback, nor that they are being monitored.
The new EOBR system enables the collection of comfort dimensions baseline data in the
months September and October 2015. Second, the period in between November 2015 and
mid-December 2015 is used to disentangle the announcement effect from the feedback
effect. The company held a kickoff event at the start of November 2015. At this event it
was made clear to the drivers that they are being monitored and that they will receive
feedback in the next month. In the third phase, from mid-December 2015 until November
2016, drivers receive their monthly feedback reports with peer-comparison feeedback.
Finally, the post-experimental period involves a one-time notification to the drivers that
the peer-comparison messages are no longer included in the reports.9 The on-the-road
coaching program starts around the kickoff event in November 2015.
Previous research has shown that workers adjust their effort in response to a feedback
announcement, even though they have not yet learned any new information from the first
feedback round (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 2011). The company’s decision to separate
9The precise text of this message is as follows (translated from Dutch): “Dear colleague, starting this
month, this report will no longer include information about your performance relative to your colleagues”.
This message was part of the report that was distributed in November 2016 to all drivers that were part
of the treatment conditions with peer-comparison feedback. Hence, all drivers except those in the control
condition. See Section 3.3 for further details on the experimental conditions.
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these events is a convenient feature of our research setting. To rule out career concerns as
an alternative explanation, drivers were informed during the announcement period that
the feedback will not be used in formal evaluations. Apart from the feedback programs
under consideration, no other incentives were used by the company to promote green
behavior. In the spirit of Barankay (2012), the one-time notification message is included
at the end of the experiment in order to examine the effect of a withdrawal of peer-
comparison messages.
3.2 Data Collection and Sample Construction
The EOBRs are installed in three bus types. Bus types 1 and 2 have diesel engines. Type
1 is most commonly used, accounting for 75% of trips performed by the average driver.
Type 2 is mainly used for routes with a long travel distance and operates from selected
base locations. The remaining trips are performed in bus type 3, which runs on natural
gas, and is only part of the fleet in the urban area of the largest base location. Table 1
provides the start dates of data recording per bus type.
Table 1: Start Date of Data Recording per Bus Type
Bus type 1 Bus type 2 Bus type 3
Fuel consumption 1 Jan. 2015 1 Jan. 2015 n.a.
Acceleration 1 Sep. 2015 9 Nov. 2015 1 Sep. 2015
Braking 1 Sep. 2015 9 Nov. 2015 1 Sep. 2015
Cornering 1 Sep. 2015 1 Sep. 2015 9 Nov. 2015
We perform a few steps to construct the final sample. The most important step is the re-
moval of observations with no outcome data due to an absent bus identifier (290,737 obs;
22.73% of the full sample). We also drop observations with values that are clearly unrea-
sonable, such as a fuel economy (kilometers per liter of fuel) of less than 1 or more than 8
(1,259 obs; 0.10%), a difference of more than 1 hour between actual and planned driving
time (156 obs; 0.01%) and outcomes that are more than five standard deviations above
the means of the ABC dimensions (4,003 obs; 0.31%). The complete sample construction
is detailed in the Appendix. The final sample consists of 842,845 trip-level observations,
which we match with driver, trip, and daily weather characteristics.10
10Weather data are collected from a weather station located in the regional capital and is maintained
by the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI).
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3.3 Treatment Variation: Feedback Reports
The company made clear during exploratory talks that it wants to target feedback mes-
sages at the poor-performing driving dimensions, arguing that the biggest gains in fuel-
efficient and comfortable driving are to be made by focusing on the behaviors with the
largest room for improvement. These messages are integrated in the monthly feedback
reports. Our experiment varies the number and type of feedback messages and is best
described as a natural field experiment (Harrison and List 2004) because drivers operate
in a natural environment and are not informed about the experimental variation.
All 409 tenured drivers operating in the area are included in our research design.
Drivers with a temporary contract, 67 in total, are excluded because their behavior is
only observed for short and irregular time spans. The tenured drivers are randomly
allocated to the experimental conditions, stratified along the dimensions of base location,
gender, and years of service at the company.
In the experimental conditions, we construct reference groups in which driver per-
formance on each comfort dimension is compared to colleagues with the same base
location and treatment status.11 This creates a natural and homogeneous comparison
group for drivers in which competition is likely to generate strong incentives (Lazear and
Rosen 1981, Delfgaauw et al. 2013). The comfort dimensions are disaggregated measures
of driving behavior over which drivers have a strong direct influence, thereby making the
feedback as concrete and useful as possible to the recipients.
At the start of each month, the company shares with us a summary per driver de-
tailing his or her performance during the previous month. We use this information to
determine how a driver performed compared to the reference group of peers and assign
peer-comparison messages accordingly.12 Negative (positive) messages are provided if a
driver belongs to the bottom 50% (top 25%) of the reference group.
11This is because pre-treatment information revealed that high and low scores are occasionally con-
centrated in base locations. Limiting peer comparison groups to drivers with the same treatment status
ensures that reference groups are relatively small – such that drivers have a reasonable chance of earning
(avoiding) a positive (negative) message – and avoids indirect treatment interference.
12The performance summary contains information about the bus-specific percentile rank of the driver
on each driving dimension (compared to all drivers in the concession area who also operated on that bus
type in the previous month). The final percentile rank for each driving dimension is the weighted sum of
the percentile ranks of the driver on each bus type. The weight is determined based on kilometers driven
on a bus type as a share of total kilometers driven that month. All drivers within a reference group are
ranked according to their final ranks in order to determine how a driver performed compared to peers.
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In treatment 1 (1n/0p), one negative message is provided if drivers underperform
on a particular dimension. That is, they are explicitly informed that they rank poorly
compared to peers and are encouraged to improve. In treatment 2 (1n/1p), drivers ad-
ditionally have a chance of receiving one positive message. In this case, they are made
aware of their good ranking and are encouraged to keep up the good work. If a driver
performs poor (or well) on multiple dimensions, one will be randomly chosen. Finally,
in treatment 3 (3n/0p), drivers run the risk of receiving negative messages on all comfort
dimensions. Using treatment 2 (1n/1p) as an example, the precise (translated) text of
the messages reads as follows:
Dear colleague,
In terms of taking corners, you belong to the top 25 percent of the bus drivers in your location.
You are doing excellent on this dimension!
In terms of braking, you belong to the bottom 50 percent of the bus drivers in your location.
You can improve on this dimension!
A printed version of the report (with the messages integrated) is created around the 15th
day of each feedback month and delivered via the team manager or pigeonhole. Drivers in
the control condition receive the same feedback report but without the targeted messages,
so as to account for general feedback effects.13 The report contains general feedback in the
form of a letter score, ranging from A (highest score) to D (lowest score) on the comfort
dimensions and fuel economy. Furthermore, it contrasts the overall score of the individual
driver with the score of his or her base location. A sample feedback report is provided in
Figure A1. The experimental conditions are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Experimental Conditions
Conditions General feedback Max # positive message(s) Max # negative message(s)
Control Yes 0 0
Treatment 1 Yes 0 1
Treatment 2 Yes 1 1
Treatment 3 Yes 0 3
13Working with an uninformed control group is not possible due to company policies requiring that
every driver should at least receive some feedback. By handing out reports to drivers in the control
condition, we embed the experimental variation more naturally and explicitly recognize and control for
Hawthorne and general feedback effects.
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Table 3 provides a summary of the data per experimental condition and shows that the
randomization is successful: both driver and trip characteristics are well balanced across
the experimental groups. In particular, we observe no significant differences in driving
behavior during the pre-experimental period. Drivers are on average 54 years old and
work for 20 years at the company. Most drivers are male (89%). The average trip had a
length of 31 km and was typically driven in rural areas (84%).
The tailored nature of the messages is illustrated in Table 4. Panel A reports the
percentage share of drivers receiving one of the possible message combinations in each
treatment and feedback round (conditional on receiving a feedback report).14 It highlights
the flexible design of the treatments. Each treated driver is assigned an individualized
message combination which points to behaviors that require attention. In treatment 1
(1n/0p), for example, about 70% of the drivers receive a negative message in a given
feedback round, meaning that they perform poorly compared to peers on one of the three
comfort dimensions. The remaining 30% performs well on all dimensions and is therefore
not notified with a message. Panel B details the composition of the message combinations
and shows that all ABC dimensions are well-represented.
How often a treated driver was in the top 25% or bottom 50% on a given driving
dimension is shown in Figure A2. The figure plots the number of feedback rounds a
driver was in the bottom or top part of the reference group divided by the total number
of feedback rounds in which the driver received a feedback report. This gives an indication
how often a driver was eligible for targeted messages. For many drivers it varied per round
whether they were in the target groups. We also observe on each dimension that there
are drivers who were always or never in the bottom (top) part. On acceleration, 19%
(16%) of the treated drivers were never (always) in the bottom 50%. For the top 25%,
the corresponding figures are 42% (9%). Outcomes are similar for braking and cornering.
This illustrates the motivation behind the messages. The detailed data allow for
precise identification of good and bad performers in every feedback round. The messages
are subsequently intended as a means to assist these drivers in offering guidance on where
to improve (maintain) performance. They are updated every round to inform about
progress and to avoid drivers from slacking off.
14No report is created when drivers were absent in the previous month (on which the report is based).
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Experimental Conditions
Full sample C (0n/0p) T1 (1n/0p) T2 (1n/1p) T3 (3n/0p)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Pre-experimental performance
Fuel economy 4.06 0.31 4.05 0.30 4.09 0.32 4.05 0.33 4.05 0.31
Acceleration 12.30 6.43 12.38 6.65 11.91 6.59 12.28 6.27 12.61 6.27
Braking 3.00 4.39 3.20 4.63 2.98 4.60 2.59 3.66 3.25 4.63
Cornering 2.88 4.93 2.99 5.11 2.85 5.17 2.62 4.60 3.06 4.89
Demographics
Year of birth 1962 8.28 1962 8.83 1962 8.62 1962 7.62 1962 8.12
Year of employment 1996 11.53 1996 11.65 1996 11.48 1996 11.32 1996 11.83
% share of FTE≥0.9 76.28 75.73 74.51 79.41 75.49
% share of female drivers 10.51 10.68 9.80 10.78 10.78
Trip-specific variables
Punctuality -2.88 0.80 -2.80 0.86 -2.94 0.76 -2.80 0.86 -2.96 0.72
Distance traveled 31.36 13.21 31.32 13.99 31.89 12.59 31.14 12.84 31.10 13.53
Number of passengers 13.26 3.71 13.38 3.91 13.27 3.69 13.18 3.60 13.23 3.69
Number of bus stops 37.84 8.79 37.38 9.09 38.54 8.40 37.93 8.76 37.51 8.99
% share of rides:
- Morning rush hours 19.45 19.34 20.53 18.64 19.31
- Evening rush hours 19.53 19.99 18.20 20.55 19.39
- Weekend 14.09 14.31 14.01 3.98 14.03
- Holidays 9.99 9.88 10.27 9.71 10.10
- Urban area 15.84 16.77 13.68 15.89 17.00
- School 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7
% share of trips on bus types
by the average driver
Bus type 1 75.20 73.64 77.71 75.63 73.88
Bus type 2 9.65 10.21 9.34 9.30 9.75
Bus type 3 15.15 16.15 12.96 15.07 16.37
Base locations (# drivers)
Location 1 12 3 3 3 3
Location 2 61 16 15 15 15
Location 3 30 7 8 8 7
Location 4 74 19 18 18 19
Location 5 150 37 38 38 37
Location 6 82 21 20 20 21
Number of drivers 409 103 102 102 102
Notes : data collected from electronic on-board recorders (EOBR) in buses and centralized databases with driver and
trip characteristics. Fuel economy is defined as kilometers per liter of fuel. Performance on the comfort dimensions
(acceleration, braking and cornering) is measured as the number of events per 10 kilometers. Less events means better
driving behavior. The pre-experimental period is the period before receiving the first feedback report. Punctuality
is the difference in minutes between actual and planned driving time. Distance traveled is measured in kilometers.
Number of passengers is based on check-ins with public transport cards. Bus types 1 and 2 have diesel engines and
bus type 3 runs on natural gas. Morning and evening rush hours are from 7:00-10:00 and 16:00-19:00, respectively.
Holiday rides take place during, for example, Christmas, New Year’s Eve and school holidays. School rides are along
routes with schools and universities as final destinations. Stars indicate a statistically significant difference in means


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Next to the decision to provide drivers with feedback reports, the company also initiated a
coaching program. Six experienced drivers (spread over the base locations) were recruited
as coaches based on their track record of driving behavior. All coaches participated in a
training on how to approach drivers and to communicate feedback.
Since coaches are bus drivers themselves, there is only limited time available for coach-
ing activities (about one day every two weeks).15 Furthermore, the hop-on hop-off ap-
proach to on-the-road coaching makes prior and future sessions technically dependent on
each other. For these reasons, it is not possible to randomly assign coaches to drivers.
Coaches were requested at the beginning of the study to maintain a detailed log of their
activities, allowing us to pinpoint when and how often drivers are coached.
We use the coach logs to determine for every coaching date the difference in mean
baseline performance between drivers who received their first coaching versus uncoached
colleagues who were also working from the same base location on that date. If the order
of coaching is quasi-random and not based on pre-selected criteria, there should be no
systematic difference between these two groups.16 Table 5 provides evidence that the
implementation of the coaching program exhibits a quasi-random order of phase-in. The
table shows for multiple baseline performance measures the difference in means over all
coaching dates. We observe for all locations combined that the difference is never signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 5% level. Separating by base location, we obtain similar
results for all but one base location. Note, however, that the differences at this location
are similar to what is found for other locations.
Table A2 repeats the analysis for non-performance-related descriptives. Importantly,
there are no significant differences in the share of experimental groups. This is convenient
as it shows that coaches did not select according to who receives peer-comparison mes-
sages. Balance is also observed on other driver and trip characteristics. At two locations
drivers with a greater share of trips during morning (evening) rush hours have a slightly
greater (smaller) chance of being coached. This is likely to be planning-related: most
15Coaches can decide which day they use for coaching. They vary the day of the week such that every
driver has a chance of being coached.
16Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer (2007) argue that a randomized order of phase-in is often the fairest
way of implementing a program over time in contexts where it is not acceptable for individuals to receive
no support.
16
coaches start early and then quit at some point.
In a coaching session, a coach rides along with a bus driver for a portion of the driver’s
shift. This allows the coach to personalize the feedback and to direct attention to the
driver-specific issues at hand. A session is not announced to the driver beforehand. The
coach writes down examples of what goes well and wrong and identifies obstacles that
may hinder driver performance, such as sharp corners. Due to the presence of passengers,
there is no or limited interaction between the driver and the coach during the ride. The
coach provides feedback once the trip is completed and passengers have left the bus. The
trip is reconstructed using the written-down examples. Both personal and general advice
are offered that focus on fuel consumption, punctuality and the ABC dimensions. Drivers
are treated as equals and feedback is delivered in a constructive and positive manner.



















Announcement Post PC Feedback
2015w40 2016w1 2016w14 2016w27 2016w40 2017w1
week
 coached (cumulative)  coached (per week)
Notes: moment of first coaching for drivers. Dark blue bars indicate the drivers
who received their first coaching during a specific week as a share of the total
number of drivers operating during that week. The light blue bars depict
the cumulative share of coached drivers operating during a week. Feedback
was announced around 1 November 2015 and first distributed as reports after
15 December 2015, with follow-up reports in each subsequent month. Peer-
comparison messages were removed from the reports from November 2016 on.
Figure 2 shows that most drivers received their first coaching in the weeks following
the kickoff event in November 2015. During this period, the company reserved extra
time for the coaches to ride along with drivers and to answer questions related to the











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































feedback report in mid-December 2015. In a select number of cases, drivers participated
in additional coaching sessions (55 drivers, 18% of all coached drivers). We control for
these extra coaching sessions in our analyses.
The figure also highlights two other issues related to the coaching program. First,
the cumulative share of coached drivers operating during a week is more or less flat after
April 2016. We have complete coach logs for the period till 30 April, 2016. Some coaches
indicated that they no longer provided or kept track of coaching after April 2016. In our
evaluation of the coaching program, we therefore restrict attention to the period until 30
April 2016. Second, 30 drivers (10% of all coached drivers) received coaching prior to
the feedback announcement. In the regression analysis, we change for these drivers the
post-announcement date from 1 November 2015 to their respective coaching dates.
4 Results
4.1 Feedback reports
Drivers are considered to be treated when a feedback report is created and delivered via
the team manager or pigeonhole. A post-feedback indicator takes on the value 1 after
receiving the first feedback report, 0 otherwise. This definition makes no selection on
the actual receipt of the peer-comparison messages. From a policy perspective this is
useful because it captures the aggregate performance of the treatments when applied to
an eligible population (see also Allcott 2011). For each driver we can determine when a
new report is created and delivered. The start of the post-feedback period may differ per
driver due to a possible absence in the prior month to the one on which the first report
is based. A no-report indicator captures drivers operating after 15 December 2015 (first
feedback round) but who have not yet received their first report.
In order to identify the aggregate performance of the treatments, we make use of
a difference-in-differences regression specification that models our measures of driving
behavior Yit conditional on treatment status Ti, an indicator for the post-feedback period
postfeedbackit, a vector of control variables Xit, driver fixed effects µi, day fixed effects
υd, and bus type fixed effects κb:
Yit = Ti · postfeedbackit · τ +Xit · θ + µi + υd + κb + υd · κb + it (1)
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Day fixed effects are included rather than a common post-feedback indicator in order to
account for driver-specific starting dates of the post-feedback period. By interacting day-
and bus type fixed effects, we relax the common trends assumption between bus types to
address potential differences over time in the ease (or difficulty) of avoiding ABC events
due to different thresholds per bus type. As control variables, we include a no-report
indicator, travel distance, punctuality (difference between actual and planned driving
time), and the number of passengers and bus stops. We also incorporate dummies for
morning (7:00-10:00) and evening (16:00-19:00) rush hours, trips in urban areas, fill-in
rides, and trips that were driven in a smaller or larger bus. We control for daily weather
conditions (average temperature/wind and total rainfall) in robustness check specifications
without day fixed effects. The model is estimated with robust standard errors, clustered
by drivers so as to account for within-driver correlation patterns in the error term it
(Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2004).
The results are presented in Table 6. For ease of exposition, we restrict attention to
fuel economy and acceleration and refer to the Appendix for other driving dimensions.
Results are shown for all trajectories as well as for urban and rural areas separately. In the
post-feedback period, all urban trips were performed in bus type 3 and there are therefore
no post-feedback outcomes for fuel economy on urban trajectories. We prefer to think of
urban trips as a separate sub-sample. As discussed in Section 2.2, almost all urban trips
were in the vicinity of base location 5 (about 98%) and driven in bus type 3 (about 96%),
which runs on natural gas, has a distinct set of thresholds for the ABC dimensions, and
operates exclusively from location 5. To facilitate comparisons across driving behaviors,
we will thus focus mainly on rural trips in our discussion of the results.
In general, the table shows that the peer-comparison messages do not further improve
driving behavior after controlling for the “general feedback effect” of the control group.
The point estimates across treatments for an aggregate measure of driving behavior (fuel
economy) are small in size, about 0.007 (0.015σ)17, and are (jointly) not statistically
significant.18 Similar qualitative results are obtained for acceleration as a disaggregated
driving behavior. Table A3 in the Appendix indicates that braking and cornering are also
not affected by the peer-comparison messages at a conventional 5% significance level.
17Reported effect sizes are based on the within standard deviation of the sample used for estimation.
18In a Wald test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the treatment effects are jointly equal to


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































From the negative (positive) sign of the no-report indicator (not shown) on fuel economy
(acceleration), we conjecture that drivers in general do respond to the feedback reports but
that there is no additional overall effect of the peer-comparison messages. Fuel economy
among no-report drivers is 0.06 lower compared to post-feedback drivers in the control
group, which constitutes a small effect of about 0.13σ.
The absence of an effect of peer-comparison feedback on conservation efforts among
workers is consistent with findings from another recent study conducted in a similar setting
(Blader et al. 2016). In that study, however, it is noted that absent aggregate effects
may mask temporal effects and improved performance among sub-groups of drivers. By
identifying feedback rounds and post-coaching rides, we can examine how peer-comparison
messages change driving over time and whether effects differ for (un)coached drivers.
Figure 3 examines temporal effects by plotting the treatment effects per feedback
round. The first round starts around 15 December 2015, with a new report being dis-
tributed in each subsequent month. The feedback report in November 2016 contained a
text message notifying all treated drivers that they will no longer receive peer-comparison
messages. We observe that drivers in treatment 3 (3n/0p) perform slightly better on
acceleration in the first few feedback rounds, about half an event less per 10 kilometers
(0.12σ) but this effect fades out over time. The general pattern, however, is that there
are no temporal effects of the peer-comparison messages on driving behavior.
Table A4 compares pre-experimental to post-experimental driving performance. We
observe that treated and control drivers perform very similar in the post-experimental
period (15 November 2016 - 31 January 2017). This indicates that treated drivers did
not habituate to a more efficient and comfortable driving style on top of what is already
observed among control drivers. It also suggests that treated drivers did not respond to
the notification of a withdrawal of peer-comparison messages in the feedback reports.19
Thus far we have disregarded any differences between coached and uncoached drivers.
Given the more or less simultaneous introduction of coaching sessions and feedback re-
ports, however, it is likely that drivers compare the feedback from both programs and
may adjust their effort accordingly. First, we aim to quantify the independent effect of a
single coaching session and then proceed with a discussion of possible interaction effects.
19Results on temporal and post-experimental effects are similar for braking and cornering. In the
interest of space, we do not include these results in the Appendix but they are available upon request.
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(f) T3 (3n/0p): acceleration
Notes: treatment effects per feedback round based on rural trips. The dotted green lines
indicate 95% confidence intervals. The time period is from 1 January 2015 until 15 November
2016, when it was communicated to the treated drivers that they will no longer receive peer-
comparison messages. Fuel economy is defined as kilometers per liter of fuel. Acceleration is
measured as the number of events per 10 kilometers (less events means better driver behavior).
Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors (clustered by drivers) and control for
driver, day, bus type, and bus type x day fixed effects as well as for punctuality (difference
between actual and planned driving time), morning and evening rush hours, smaller and larger
buses, fill-in trips, trip distance, number of passengers and bus stops, and drivers operating
after 15 December 2015 (first feedback round for most drivers) but who have not yet received
their first report.
4.2 On-The-Road Coaching
In order to identify the effect of a single on-the-road coaching session, we restrict our
attention to the first coaching moment of each driver and control for the small number of
additional coaching sessions. We observe the driving behavior of coached and uncoached
drivers (coaches are excluded from this sample) before and after the session and there-
fore make use of a difference-in-differences approach to identify the coaching effect. Our
variable of interest, postcoachingit, identifies the day of first coaching and the period
thereafter for each driver. Day fixed effects υd are included to absorb general day-to-
day variation in driving behavior that is not due to coaching or explained by the control
variables. We use the same set of control variables as in the previous section. The corre-
23
sponding regression is estimated with robust standard errors, clustered by drivers, and is
specified as follows:
Yit = postcoachingit · β +Xit · θ + µi + υd + κb + υd · κb + it (2)
The results are provided in Table 7. The first three columns report per driving dimension
the overall effects on different trajectories. Focusing on rural trips, we observe that a single
coaching session (marginally) improves fuel economy (0.04σ, p = 0.057) and acceleration
(0.11σ, p < 0.001). The last three columns show that the gains from coaching are mainly
achieved in the first weeks after coaching. In these columns, we replace the post-coaching
dummy with indicators for the day of coaching and the first weeks thereafter. The largest
improvements are observed during the coaching day: fuel economy goes up (0.23σ, p <
0.001) and acceleration events go down (0.26σ, p < 0.001). Improvements persist in the
ensuing weeks, albeit with a smaller magnitude. Table A5 provides the results for braking
and cornering. Braking events only go down during the day of coaching (0.10σ, p = 0.002),
with little evidence of persistence in the ensuing weeks. Cornering also improves during
the coaching day (0.20σ, p < 0.001) and there is some evidence of short-run persistence
in the weeks following the coaching session.
Figure 4 further elaborates on temporal effects by plotting coaching effects on rural
trips in the weeks that are in close proximity to the coaching date. We observe strong
improvements during and in the wake of coaching. These gains in fuel economy and accel-
eration persist for about eight to nine weeks. Improvements are less precisely estimated
at the end of the 10-week interval. This suggests that, as time progresses, coaching effects
decay and drivers seem to fall back into old driving habits. We observe no differences in
driving behavior in the ten weeks prior to coaching, which lends support to our earlier










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































−10 −9 −8 −7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
week
(b) Acceleration
Notes: driving performance in the weeks before and after coaching based on rural trips. The
vertical spikes indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variables are fuel economy
(km/liters) and for acceleration it is the number of events per 10 kilometers (less events means
better driving behavior). Each graph plots the regression coefficients of dummy variables
indicating the day of coaching (normalized to zero) and the weeks that are in close proximity
to this event. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors (clustered by drivers) and
control for post-coaching rides after an additional coaching session, travel distance, punctuality
(difference between actual and planned driving time), number of passengers and bus stops,
morning and evening rush hours, fill-in rides, and trips that were driven in a smaller or larger
bus. Coaches are excluded from the sample.
4.3 Interaction Effects
Table 8 documents the interaction effects between the two feedback programs. Comparing
coached and uncoached drivers in the control group with general feedback, we find that
coached drivers perform slightly better during the experimental period. Fuel economy is
0.053 higher (0.12σ, p = 0.001) and excessive acceleration decreased with about half an
event less per 10 kilometers (0.13σ, p = 0.010).20
Importantly, however, we observe that coached drivers in treatments 1 (1n/0p) and 3
(3n/0p) perform significantly worse in the experimental period compared to the coached
drivers in the control group, with a lower fuel economy of about 0.077 (0.17σ, p = 0.008)
and 0.065 (0.14σ, p = 0.020), respectively. The adverse direction of the effects is similar
for the ABC dimensions but these effects are, in general, less precisely estimated. The
negative interaction effects indicate that peer-comparison messages have an adverse effect
20Table A6 shows that there is also improved braking (0.11σ, p = 0.018). There are no significant
differences in cornering.
26
on performance when recipients already received tailored coaching in the past.
For uncoached drivers, in turn, we find that drivers in treatments 1 (1n/0p) and 3
(3n/0p) tend to improve on their driving behavior compared to drivers in the control
group. Fuel economy is about 0.052 higher (0.12σ). Improvements are also observed on
the ABC dimensions but these, again, are less precisely estimated. Our results stress the
importance of taking into account interaction effects when designing and implementing
multiple energy conservation interventions.
5 Conclusion
Increasing conservation efforts among workers is seen as low-hanging fruit in the battle to
reduce corporate energy consumption. In light of institutional constraints that hinder the
use of pay-for-performance plans, however, many firms are confronted with the question
how to motivate workers to save energy when a financial incentive to do so is absent. This
has triggered much recent interest in the design and evaluation of non-financial incentives
in corporate conservation schemes.
In the transport industry, recent innovations in on-board monitoring technology open
up novel opportunities for tailoring and evaluating non-financial incentives, allowing firms
to identify high users and to tailor feedback to the underlying sources of energy consump-
tion. In this paper, we collaborate with a large public transport company and benefit
from their recent installation of on-board computers in the entire bus fleet. In a natural
field experiment, we evaluate targeted peer-comparison feedback by randomly assigning
individualized reports with varying numbers of peer-comparison messages to more than
400 bus drivers. Furthermore, we collect coach logs to quasi-experimentally evaluate the
company’s initiative to coach drivers during on-the-road sessions.
Our analysis reveals that there are important interaction effects between the two
feedback programs. While the aggregate performance of the peer-comparison messages
is not significantly different from a control group with general feedback, we observe that
coached and uncoached drivers respond differently to the messages. Uncoached drivers
show some improvement after being exposed to peer comparisons but this appears to be
offset by their coached colleagues, who perform worse in the experimental period compared
to coached drivers in the control condition. On-the-road coaching itself positively affects
27
multiple driving behaviors but the effects diminish over time.
These findings contribute to a growing body of literature on non-financial interventions
aimed at energy conservation. Most of these studies focus on households and relatively
little attention has been paid to firms. Recent studies, therefore, evaluate these inter-
ventions in corporate settings and provide us with new insights about worker motivation
in relation to conservation efforts. This paper complements these studies and suggests
that there is great potential in reducing corporate energy consumption by designing and
implementing policies that target workers rather than the firm as a whole.
Our research points to several directions for future research. First, using monitoring
technology to trace performance differentials to its underlying sources creates ample op-
portunity for tailoring incentives. In this paper, we use data on various direct measures
of driving behavior to inform drivers where they perform well or poor compared to peers.
Firms increasingly have these types of data available and we reckon that designing and
evaluating other data-driven incentives could yield fruitful research. Second, we document
important interaction effects between peer-comparison feedback and on-the-road coach-
ing and believe that more research can be done that investigates interactions between
non-financial incentives. Finally, and more in general, how conservation efforts can be
stimulated when someone else pays the bill is a question in need of more answers.
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A Sample Construction
Table A1: Cleaning Steps for Sample Construction
% share of full sample
Full sample 1,278,913
Reason for dropping observation:
Duplicate observation (in terms of all variables) (6,762) 0.5%
No bus identifier (290,737) 22.73%
Bus type not eligible for EOBR (34,870) 2.73%
Error message from EOBR (31,118) 2.46%
Within-driver obs. with the same departure date/time (37,575) 2.94%
Very short rides (less than 1 kilometer) (29,588) 2.31%
Punctuality: more than 1 hour (156) 0.01%
Unreasonable outcomes of dependent variables:
- Fuel economy: less than 1 or more than 8 (1,259) 0.10%
- ABC dimensions: more than 5 SDs above the mean (4,003) 0.31%
Final sample 842,845
Notes : fuel economy is measured as kilometers per liter of fuel. The ABC comfort dimensions are the
number of events per 10 kilometers (less events means better driving behavior). Punctuality is the difference
between actual and planned driving time.
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B Sample Feedback Report
Confidential information (related to the driver and company) has been removed from the
feedback report.
Figure A1: Sample Feedback Report
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C Eligibility for Targeted Peer-Comparison Messages
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(f) Bottom 50%: cornering
Notes: the figures show for each ABC driving dimension the distribution of feedback round
shares in which treated drivers were in the top 25% or bottom 50% of the peer reference group.
The shares are calculated as the number of feedback rounds a driver was in the bottom or
top part of the reference group divided by the total number of feedback rounds in which a
feedback report was constructed for the driver. It indicates how often a driver was eligible
for a targeted peer-comparison message on a given driving dimension (the received message
combination depends on the treatment condition). The reference group consists of drivers who
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